Streamlining Medical Malpractice Jury Use: The Approach Used by Common Law Countries by Ross, Steven P
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 4
1-1-1977
Streamlining Medical Malpractice Jury Use: The
Approach Used by Common Law Countries
Steven P. Ross
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Health Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven P. Ross, Streamlining Medical Malpractice Jury Use: The Approach Used by Common Law
Countries, 1 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 47 (1977), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol1/
iss1/4
NOTES AND COMMENTS 
Streamlining Medical Malpractice Jury Use: 
The Approach Pursued By Common Law Countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
The medical profession's global aegis of mystery and awe 
has fallen.1 Patients are no longer acquiescing to unforeseen 
deleterious results: they are asking for explanations whenever 
inferior treatment is suspected. If the answers fail to con-
vince, patients increasingly seek legal remedies. 
This worldwide trend2 is most pronounced in the United 
States. In 1970,1280 malpractice claims were filed in the United 
States while only 80 were filed in Canada;3 over a period of 
twenty-five years (1947-1971) England reported 2809 claims.4 
In 1975, United States' medical malpractice insurance rates in-
creased as much as 750% for physicians with an equal or higher 
1 Sharpe & Weisstub, Medical/Legal Concerns In a Canadian Context, 3 J. LEGAL 
MED. 40·44 (1975); Addison, Medical Malpractice in Great Britain, ApPENDIX, 
H.E.W. SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, U.S. Gov. 
Print. Office, Jan., 1973, H.E.W. Pub. No. 17·00114 (OS)B·89, at 859 [hereinafter 
cited as ApPENDIX, COMMISSION REPORT]. 
2 See generally Gilder, The World Medical .Association and Medical Care, in 
INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CARE 316·25 (J. ]'ry & W. Farnsdale eds. 1972) (This 
rising trend demonstrates a "worrying phenomenon" of international importance.) 
3 A. LINDEN, CANADIAN NEGLIGENCE LAW 51 (1974); Welch, Medical Malpractice 
in Canada, in ApPENDIX, COMMISSION REPORT 850. 
4 Addison, Medical Malpractice in Great Britain, ApPENDIX COMMISSION REPORT 
857; Curran, The British Experience in Medical Malpractice: .An Upward Trend, 288 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 249 (1973) (The rate at which damages and costs have been 
increasing during the most recent years, may be identical in England and the 
United States.) 
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rate increase for hospitals.1I In some states, this trend threatens 
to erect an insurmountable barrier of entry into the profession 
and, in many more states, is forcing practicing physicians to 
alter or prematurely abandon their work. 
Many creative extra-judicial solutions have been proposeds 
to wrestle with the problem of finding a just method for reme-
dying the causes and results of medical grievances, but they 
are not to be favored.7 It is submitted that application of the 
law of malpractice can best be achieved by a court of law adept 
at the discovery of relative truths and expert in legal matters. 
Furthermore, this particular area of our law is notably sound 
in its substance. At the common sense level of human experi-
ence the present tort law of negligence rings true:8 physicians 
must be held to meet their obligations in such a manner as 
would be typical of their fellow physicians in similar situa-
tions; that is, doctors must answer to the "community stand-
ards doctrine." If a doctor fails to meet this responsibility to 
his patient, and money can recompense that injured patient, 
then it is just to hold the doctor legally liable for this financial 
reparation. In addition to awarding damages, the approbation 
of legal liability keeps the general medical profession in check," 
serving to increase the common level of health-care quality. 
This paper advances from the assumption that a viable solu-
tion to the medical malpractice problem must be one which 
preserves the role of the courts and their application of the 
theories of civil negligence. It is submitted that the ill-advised 
II Curran, Malpractice Insurance: A Genuine National Orisis, 292 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1223-24 (1975) (Mr. Curran does not supply a specific cause for the insurance 
rate increases.) 
sA. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 416-37 (1975) (arbitration boards, screening 
panels, no-fault insurance); G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS 198-207 
(1975). 
7 L. CHARFOOS, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE 138-40 (1974). Additional rea· 
sons are discussed in footnote 70, infra. 
8 A. LINDEN, CANADIAN NEGLIGENCE LAW 50-51 (1974). 
II Shapo, Ohanging Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70 's, 22 STAN. L. REV. 330, 
338 (1970). Bee also Haines, Lecture X, in JURY TRIALS: SPECIAL LECTURES O. 
THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA 170 (1969) [hereinafter cited as JURY TRIALS]; 
Of. A. LINDEN, CANADIAN NEGLIGENCE LAW at 483 (1974). 
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use of the jury institution in the United States is the factor 
which is most responsible for crippling the judicial resolution of 
the increasing number of medical malpractice complaints. 
The jury's function has dramatically metamorphosed from 
its birthright in Ninth Century France, when it merely supplied 
the facts of a local mishap to a royally appointed judge. From 
this very basic role, the jury's responsibilities slowly grew 
more active; in Seventeenth Century England, for example, the 
jury had become a champion of the commoner.10 Today, the 
jury not only discerns facts, but also applies law; standards of 
behavior have thus become creatures of everyday sensibility, 
rather than of sovereign edict. This increasingly active posture 
of the jury has operated to assure that modern concepts of 
justice are grounded in a truly participatory democracy. It is 
questionable, however, whether the benefits of the active jury 
always outweigh the detriments.ll This doubt is perhaps most 
strongly felt in medical malpractice suits.12 
A medical malpractice suit requires the objective balancing 
of unusually esoteric expert testimony. At the same time, how-
ever, the subject matter of a medical malpractice suit will likely 
evoke lay juror prejudices and sympathies which will interfere 
with that delicate balancing process. It would seem that dis-
creetly restricting the right to a jury in the United States would 
strengthen the institution. As the late Judge Charles E. Clark 
said: "[I]t is not showing care for the jury to force it into 
classes of claims where the right is dubious and the use incon-
venient and burdensome.. ." 18 This viewpoint has been 
praised as a wise middle course,14 and demonstrates that a tool 
is effective only insofar as it is appropriately applied. The 
indiscriminate use of the jury will only effect its gradual demise 
10 See discussion in text at 50-54. 
11 See discussion in text at 54-62. 
12 Space constraints require limiting discussion to medical malpractice suits. 
18 Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 59 (2nd Cir. 1961) (dissent). See alBo 
Bercouici v. Chaplin, 56 F. Supp. 417 (D.C. N.Y. 1944). 
14 WRIGHT & MILLER, 9 MODERN FEDERAL PRACTICE 10. 
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through avoidance and disuse, as exemplified by the history of 
the jury in England,15 Canada,16 and AustraliaP 
This article will attempt an analysis of the jury. It will be-
gin with a study of the history of the jury, and proceed to a 
functional examination of the use of a jury. It will then be 
suggested that the use of a jury in medical malpractice suits 
does not necessarily result in the best justice, but instead may 
effect needless complexity and delay. Finally, a legislative 
scheme will be detailed, proposing a minimum jurisdictional 
prerequisite to the use of the jury in medical malpractice 
cases.ua 
HISTORY 
The history of the jury in common law countries began in 
Ninth Century France. Juries (assizes) were formed when 
courts bid their sheriffs to assemble twelve good and lawful 
men of the neighborhood. These jurors (recognitors) reported 
the facts on oath concerning local community events which they 
had heard about and in which certain of the King's rights had 
allegedly been violated. Judges, appointed by the Crown, de-
cided the cases after being told the facts by these witness-
jurors. The judgments were made as consistently with the 
King's view as the facts would permit. IS 
In 1066, the Normans brought this jury system to England.1t 
15 Haines, Lecture X, JURY TRIALS: SPECIAL LECTURES 01' THE LAW SOCIETY 
0 .. UPPER CANADA iii (1969) j See generally, R. SIMON, THE JURY SYSTEM IN 
AMERICA 16 (1975). 
16 Idem. 
17 Note, Juriea: The Western Australian E:x;perience, 11 U. WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
L. REV. 99, 100 (1973). 
17. The proposal is patterned upon the jury system used in Canada where each 
province fashions its own civil trial practices. The provinces have frequently opted 
for the statutorily limited right to a jury trial similar to Quebec Province's, from 
which this article. draws its model. The underlying belief is that restricting access 
to a jury in this manner makes the jury institution more enduring. 
18 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108 (1963). 
19 Other species of trial introduced into England by William the Conqueror in· 
eluded compurgation and ordeal. Compurgation required the civil or criminal de-
fendant to take an oath 'to his innocence in open court with 11 of his neighbors 
(compurgators) present to avow the belief in their consciences that what the de-
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Then, states Maitland, "the germ of trial by jury, having once 
been introduced . . . in these formal assizes . . . began to 
spread outside their limits to take a new shape and become 
susceptible of free development." 20 In the Thirteenth Century 
the custom arose of allowing juries to make the decisions. 
However, "the jury remained for some centuries a body of men 
who gave their decision, not upon the evidence placed before 
them, but upon their knowledge of the persons, the circum-
stances or the locality." 21 As the communities expanded, 
thereby preventing jurors from gaining knowledge of alleged 
crimes through personal contact, juries evolved into courtroom 
finders of fact. 
During the Seventeenth Century, the English jury gained 
formidable strength and respect. This rise to high regard was 
due in large part to the common folk who stood up, as jurors, 
against the royal judges who had customarily browbeat the 
jury into revealing the facts to the Crown's best advantage. 
The juries now gave a verdict where once the King had spoken 
through his judge. This evolution of the jury, however, was 
unique to the common law, for while the English jury under-
went these developments, Roman law had spread across Europe, 
eroding lay participation in the trial process. Ultimately, the 
Roman law caused the civil jury to "fall into oblivion on the 
European Continent where it had been originally created." 22 
Colonization brought the jury system to England's numerous 
and distant territorial acquisitions.23 In the colonies, and 
fendant swore to was the truth. Ordeal d.emanded great physical tests of torture 
by fire or water from which superna.tural intervention would rescue the innocent 
person. These means of obtaining evidence of guilt and innocence were abolished 
in the 13th Century. 
Baeck, The Legal Systems 01 Continental Europe, in AMERICAN FOREIGN LAW 
Assoc., JURY TRIAL PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES at Appendia: 
I (1955) (unpublished report in Harvard Law School Library) (hereinafter cited 
as JURY TRIAL PRACTICE). 
20 Maitland, THE FORMS OJ' ACTION AT COMMON LAW 34 (Chaytor & Whittaker 
eds.1958). 
21 18 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OJ' ENGLAND (3rd Edn.) 31 (1970). 
22 Baeck, JURY TRIAL PRACTICE at 3. 
23 Cheang, Jury Trial: The Singapore Experience, 11 U. WESTERN AUSTRALIA L. 
REV. 99, 120 n.l (1973). 
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throughout the formative era of United States' history, the jury 
continued its self-assumed role as champion of the common 
citizen.24 In the United States today the right to a jury trial is 
firmly secured in the federal courts by the 7th Amendment to 
the federal constitution and in the state courts by 48 state con-
stitutions.2lI Thus, in the United States, the jury has assumed a 
position of greater importance than it had occupied in Great 
Britain. Prior to World War II, England had ceased using 
civil juries for most of the purposes she had created them for. 
Today, the jury has been completely abolished from personal 
injury trials in England.26 The evolution of the jury system in 
the United States was also quite different from its modern 
history in other former colonies. In most common law coun-
tries, upon reaching its zenith, use of the civil jury rapidly de-
clined. In Canada, for example, provincial judiciaries are now 
characte!ized by an almost complete absence of juries from civil 
actions.27 In Australia, similarly, the civil jury which had been 
employed in all common law actions triable in the Queen's 
Bench was, by 1971, excluded from Australian courts, unless 
ordered by ajudge.28 
24 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108 (the, Jeffersonian commonfolk, as jurors, 
came near to fisticuffs with their Federalist judges); Kaplan, Trial By Jury, in 
, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 01' NEW YORK, MEDICAL AND DENTAL MALPRACTICE - 2d 
27 (1972). 
2lI The right to a jury in federal eases has not been incorporated through the 
14th Amendment to impose civil jury regulations upon the state courts. State 
legislatures have been held the forums most suited to choosing the remedy best 
adapted to protect the interests concerned. 8ee, Hardware Dealers Mutual Lil. 
Ins. Co. 11. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1951). In developing these standards the 
states have adapted civil jury procedures similar to the federal requirements. 
E.g., CALII'. CONST. art. 1, § 7; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 20; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 
15; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
26 Green, Juries and J1t8tice - The Jury's RoZe in Personal Injury Cases, 62 
U. ILLINOIS L. FORUM 152, 167 n.72 (1962); Lenhoff, JURY TRIAL PRACTICE at 
.4ppendU: V, p.l. 
27 Haines, Lecture X, JURY TRIALS: SPECIAL LECTURES 01' THE LAW SOCIETY 
01' UPPER CANADA iii (1969). Even on the criminal side, where guaranteed by the 
Canadian Criminal Code, the jury right is actually exercised only in those serious 
eases where it is obligatory. Between 92% and 95% of all Canadian criminal cases 
are hied before a judge alone. 
28 Note, Juries: The Western .41t8tralian Er&pel'ience, 11 U. WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
L. REV. 99,100·101 (1973). 
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In the 1930's-1940's Jerome Frank and other leading Ameri-
can jurists began advocating dismissal of civil juries.29 En-
couraged by the pressing medical malpractice emergency and 
by the Supreme Court's recent decisions upholding the use of 
non-unanimous verdicts and six-person juries, it seems a pro-
pitious moment in United States' history to give some effect 
to these suggestions. 
There is historical justification for the United States to be 
mindful of its brother and sister common law nations' re-
evaluation and subsequent abatement of civil jury use. History, 
as shown above, reveals that the jury was never the perfect 
embodiment of lofty democratic ideals. Rather, it has laudibly 
served more practical purposes and has maintained a flexibility 
which enables growth and change in response to the peculiar 
needs of the times. Today, the historical jury function of bring-
ing the facts of an offense to a judge's attention has no place: 
Like the 'town hall' meetings of the New England colony 
days, the jury is . . . part of an earlier era: It was im-
portant and should be revered for the role it played in devel-
oping our sense of democracy; but by the 20th Century it 
has outgrown its usefulness.80 
Nor is its past function as a check against pro-government 
judges appropriate.8! Today, jury history instructs us to adapt 
our malleable jury structure to solve the current medical mal-
practice crisis as it has historically been molded to meet perti-
nent demands in the past. It should be noted that what is 
advocated is an adaptation of the uses of a jury, rather than 
the complete rejection of that institution. This is because the 
29 Bee J. FRANE, COURTS ON TRIAL (1963); cf~Jultice Cardozo: "Fe.w would 
be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened 8YlItem of 
justice would be impouible without (juries)." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325 (1937) (majority opinion). 
80 R. SIMON, THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA. 15 (1975). 
81 Although the risks of a judge's corruption and personal bias must be boldly 
resisted, it is questionable whether this should be a function of the jury's, and if 
10, one requiring a jury in every trial of every legal claim. If it does, then liti-
gants Ihould never be permitted to consent to a non-jury trial nor should juries be 
omitted from trials at equity. cf., R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 76 (1969). 
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jury can still perform a useful function, even in medical mal-
practice cases, where it seems that the usefulness of the jury 
is most limited. 
FUNOTION 
It is believed that the task for the juries which do sit in civil 
cases in common law countries today is to (1) ferret out the 
pertinent facts, (2) apply the given law, and (3) promote demo-
cratic justice. Despite this worthy constellation of functions, 
the low degree of their fulfillment and the great time and 
financial costs militate in favor of reforming wide usage of 
medical malpractice juries. 
(1) Fact Finding 
Evidentiary rules are applied to the admission of all in-
formation to remedy the fact that lay jurors lack specialized 
training in the law and that each case may be the juror's first 
exposure to the courts. The fear is that the jurors would other-
wise attribute incorrect significance to certain factors by al-
lowing their personal emotions to skew their weighing of the 
evidence. These complex rules, however, tend to distort the re-
telling of the story by eliminating evidence which is prejudicial 
. although admissible as material and relevant to the portrayal 
Despite these rules, the successful play on jury emotions is 
commonly attested to.82 "Mr. Prejudice and Miss Sympathy 
are witnesses whose testimony is never recorded but which 
nonetheless must be reckoned with in trials by jury." 88 
The distortion effects caused by both the imperfect exclu-
sionary rules of evidence and the jury's emotional bias may be 
heightened by the jurors' lack of a scientific background. Re-
sponsible factual determinations in medical malpractice cases 
32 No definite eonelusions ean be drawn, however, due to the numerous eonllieting 
opinions and empirical studies. Bee L. CHARJ'OOS, THE MEDICAL MALPIU.CTICE CASE 
138 (1974); KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, 149·162, 275·394 (1966) 
(regarding criminal juries). Bee aZso, Town v. Areher, 4 Onto L. R. 383, 388 (1902). 
83 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 121·122 (1963) (Balsae is attributed with defining 
"jury" a8 "twelve men who decide who has the better lawyer.") 
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are especially difficult by lay jurors as they do not possess the 
requisite medical base upon which to gauge the expert testi-
mony of conflicting medical witnesses. Owing to these inherent 
trial and jury traits, jurors are at a great disadvantage in 
finding the facts with which to judge a doctor's conduct: 
Trial by jury, as a method of determining facts, is anti-
quated . . . and inherently absurd - so much so that no 
[doctor,] lawyer, judge, scholar, prescription-clerk, cook, or 
mechanic in a garage would ever think for a moment of 
employing that method for determining the facts in any 
situation that concerned him." 
These factors wear upon the jury's patience and attention span 
such that twelve wandering minds could be said to characterize 
that silent groUp.81S It therefore seems overly optimistic to ex-
pect a jury in a medical malpractice suit or, indeed, in any 
complex, protected litigation, to deliver a reasoned verdict.80 
(2) Application of Law 
The lack of confidence in jurors' fact finding abilities, as 
illustrated by the prolix evidentiary rules, is incompatible with 
the treatment jurors receive regarding the law which they are 
given to apply to those facts. 
Juries have the disadvantage ... of being treated like chil-
dren while the testimony is being given, [i.e. enforcement of 
evidentiary guidelines] but then are doused with a kettlefull 
of law, during the charge, that would make a third year law 
student blanch.8T 
84Id. at 124. 
811 Id. at 124·25 (" There is probably more woolgathering in jury boxes than in 
any other place on earth" - Osborn quoted.) 
86 See Du BOIS, Punitive Damages in PtJrsonal Injury, Products Liability and 
Professional Malpractice Cases: Bonansa or Disaster," 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 344, 
.353 (1976) (concludes that the power to punish should be shifted from the jury to 
the less emotional trial judge). 
87Id. at 117 (quoting J. Bok). "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects 
can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be 
unmitigated fiction." Cf. Krulewitch v. U.S., 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson 
concurring) . 
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The jury's response may well be to avoid the complicated in-
struction by applying its own homespun sense of justice rather 
than the law given it. This phenomenon of deciding cases 
upon self-styled ad hoc law is customarily termed, "jury law-
lessness. " 38 
Jury lawlessness is exemplified by the jury which chooses not 
to follow its jurisdiction's doctrine of contributory negligence.89 
Rather than obeying the court's charge by refusing to grant 
an award to the plaintiff who is partly responsible for bringing 
on the mishap, this jury finds the defendant liable. The jury 
reduces the damages they would have otherwise levied against 
the defendant by their monetary equivalent to the plaintiff's 
contribution. In so refusing to recognize the plaintiff's con-
tribution in the manner required by the judge, the jury has sub-
stituted its own rule of comparative negligence for the law of 
the court. Such a jury has become an uncontrollable force in 
lawmaking. 
Jury lawlessness is defended as a "quiet distortion that 
presently adapts (the law) to the needs of a rough justice." 40 
The pri,ce in caprice and duplicity is too dear to pay for this 
creative law reform.41 There is little force to the alternative 
argument that, despite its faults, the lawlessness provides a 
. valuable function as a safety valve for potential victims of the 
unfeeling letter of law. Advocating additional procedural safe-
guards is appropriate when dealing with accused parties in a 
criminal proceeding, but not with these civil litigants whose 
stakes are significantly smaller. 
88 Id. at 130-135. 
39 Sedler, Weinstein, Boutine Bifurcation 01 Jury Negligence Trial8, 14 VAN». L. 
QUARTERLY 831, 833 (1961). 
40 Traynor, Fact Skepticism and th.e Judicial Proce88, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 
640 (1958); R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PHILOSOPHY 01' LAw 68 (1954) 
("Jury lawlessness is an agency of justice chiefly in connection with the moral 
quality of conduct where the special circumstances exclude that 'intelligence without 
passion' which, according to Aristotle, characterizes the law.' ') Similar ex-
pressions collected at Fleming, 8ujJlciency 01 the Evidence and Jury-Control De-
wes ,A,voidable Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REV. 218, 247-248 (1961). 
41 R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 76 (1969). 
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The inability of lay people to learn and apply substantive 
law with such a short exposure to the legal doctrine frustrates 
the jurors and encourages them to fashion and implement laws 
of their own design.42 The cumulative result is a verdict resting 
upon a shaky factual determination to which a handicapped 
understanding of the law is then applied. 
(3) Promoting Democratic Justice 
Civil jury use is irreconcilable with the democratic principle 
that a government must be "of laws and not of men." The 
companion watchword: "supremacy of law," does not prevail 
where different juries will give different verdicts in factually 
similar cases. A partial cause of this lack of uniformity among 
verdicts, and concomitant loss of predictability in the law, lies 
with juries applying their own aberrant understanding of the 
given law or their varying species of homemade law. Although 
a democracy should make an allowance from legal certainty and 
uniformity to gain individualized justice in unique fact situa-
tions, this should always be "accomplished openly, and not 
furtively by such a surreptitious technique as 'jury lawless-
ness' ".48 
It is a fallacy to think of juries as being comprised of a 
democratic cross-section of society.44 From the start, selection 
of citizens to comprise the master potential juror list, being 
42 A partial legislative cure has been proposed which would require the jury 
commissioner to send to each juror, before trial, a copy of a juror's handbook. 
, 'The juror's handbook shall inform prospective jurors in lay terminology of the 
nature and extent of their forthcoming duties as grand or trial jurors. The hand-
book may introduce and orient prospective jurors to basic trial procedures and 
legal terminology. .. Each prospective grand or trial juror shall read the juror's 
handbook before he reports for service as a juror." Mass. Senate Bill No. 1338, 
Sec. 39 (1976; re1l1ed as House Bill No. 2021, 1977). 
43J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 132,130-35 (1963). 
44 There is no federal constitutional obligation that juries be constituted of a 
fair cross-section of society in our state or federal courts. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). 
In the federal courts it is merely a "declared policy" for those courts to select 
jurors from a fair cross-section of the community in which the court sits; whether 
those people ultimately chosen to be jurors represent that cross-section seems to be 
irrelevant. 28 U.S.C. 1861. 
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limited to registered voters in most instances, eliminates many 
fine people who are simply unable or without desire to register 
to vote.4G Later, in voir dire, the attorneys' "peremptory" and 
"for cause" dismissal of jurors commonly includes removal of 
those very jurors who have the preparatory knowledge or expe-
rience in medicine.48 The need for aloof objectivity is self-
defeating in medical malpractice cases where expert witnesses 
testify and only jurors who do not know what the experts are 
talking about will be weighing their testimony.47 
Contrary to the democratic virtue of a decision-maker's ac-
countability to those affected by his determinations, the jury 
remains anonymous. The jury does not supply supportive 
reasoning for its verdicts and the method by which it arrives 
at that verdict is never revealed even when misconduct is sus-
pected.48 If the trial judge performed his duties correctly the 
jury verdict would be very difficult and often impossible to 
upset on appea1.49 This is especially true in medical malpractice 
cases where there is a wide margin of discretion left to the 
jurors:iO 
A compelling argument is provided, however, when it is urged 
that the democratic principles mentioned above must be sac-
rificed, with the use of jury trials, in order to preserve yet more 
. highly cherished ones. In contrast, it is inappropriate to join 
45 A recent statutory attempt to assure that jurors are drawn from lists which 
,. adequately represent a cross-section of the population" draws attention to this 
need for reform. Bee, Mass. House Bill No. 2021 (unenacted, 1977). 
46 That is, doctors, nurses, etc. who are removed from the jury panel. 
47 Maloney, The Challenge to the Retention of CiviZ Juri.e8, 8 LAW SOCIETY 
GAZETTE 166, 67 (1974). 
48 Bee generally, Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdict8, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 
360 (1958) (verdict by majority vote, by quotients of the individual juror's awards, 
by chance methods). 
49 W. MEREDITH, MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 01' DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS: COILILON 
LAW AND QUEBEC LAW 190 (1956). 
50 In negligence cases the jurors are instructed to apply a "reasonable man 
standard" which, being so nebulous, appellate courts are reluctant to overturn. 
Cf., R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PHILOSOPHY 01' I,AW 69 (1954); Wein-
stein, A Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials, 14 VAND. L. QUARTE&LY 
831,833 (1961). 
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those proclaiming that the abolition of this institution irrep-
arably violates the most basic tenets of democracy.11l One ideal 
which is strengthened by using juries is the latter's ability to 
provide the masses with an opportunity to participate in the 
making of their law and in their self-rule. Being a juror edu-
cates the layman as to the workings of his democracy while 
fostering an added respect for it. The jury also serves as a 
mouthpiece for public outcry or approval, thereby preventing 
elitist abuses of power52 which result when doctors,53 judges, 
and lawyers" are taken too far away from the realities of their 
patients and clients. This noble and spirited reasoning per-
suades this writer to recommend that medical malpractice jury 
use be restricted rather than be entirely forsaken. 
Thus, in medical malpractice suits, the jury system fails to 
fulfill its three functions. Moreover, the jury affirmatively 
exacts a demanding toll in the expenses and efficiency of litiga-
tion. In medical malpractice suits, these costs yield injustices 
which far outstrip the potential benefits of the civil jury. The 
greatest costs to civil litigation, which are due in whole or in 
part to the jury, are those of delay - both an overcrowding 
of the dockets and a protraction of the trial stage - and finan-
cial expense.1I11 In medical malpractice litigation these factors 
are n;tagnified to such an extent that they cause general de-
moralization among doctors and lawyers alike.lIs Doctors are 
forced to work in the shadow of a lengthy and foreign process 
before an outcome is reached on a matter which will directly 
51 Kaplan, Trial By Jury, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, MEDICAL AND DENTAL 
MALPRACTICE-2d 32-34 (1972)_ 
52 Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts, 22 STAN. L. REV. 330, 336 (1970); L. 
CHARFOOS, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE 138-9 (1974). 
53 Sharpe & Weisstub, Medical/Legal Concerns In a Canadian Context, 3 J_ LEGAL 
MED. 40,43 (1975). 
54 Cheang, Jury Trial: The Singapore Experience, 11 U. WESTERN AUSTRALIA L_ 
REV_ 99, 122-24 (1973); Baeck, The Legal Systems of Continental Europe, in JURY 
TRIAL PRACTICE, supra note 19, at viii. 
55 Se.e generally JURY TRIAL PRACTICE, supm note 21, at 1. 
56 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 124 (1963); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 18. 
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touch their livelihood. By the time this cloud has passed over, 
another claim may be threatening - one to which even the best 
of doctors could see no validity - yet to which he must sub-
mit until exoneration. The doctor well appreciates the increase 
in his insurance premiums due to legal fees inflated by pro-
tracted jury litigation; the venom thus increases between the 
doctor and the legal system. Yet, the conscientious lawyer too 
is distressed by the burdens created by these unnecessaries. 
Attenuated trials, overcrowded dockets and the additional con-
cerns to which the lawyer must adjust his trial technique so 
as to elicit the desired reactions from the jury and to best influ": 
ence the choosing and charging of the jury all contribute to 
weary the lawyer as well as the doctor. The cross is harder 
to bear for the attorney who understands that a better brand 
of justice is not being achieved in return for this increased 
burden. The attorney should actively study this problem rather 
than join passively in the doctor's dismay. 
The medical malpractice case is often subject to a delay of 
one and one-half years before the filed suit is called to trial, 
totalling three or more years from the time the alleged tort 
occurred.5T As compared to other types of personal injury 
actions, medical malpractice suits require approximately four 
. times the lawyer's time to handle, and double to triple the time 
to try.58 A recent survey demonstrates that the trial stage of 
a medical malpractice case frequently takes as long as 19 to 
28 months.59 Factors significantly contributing to this delay 
might include: juror selection, implementation of difficult rules 
of evidence, jury charges, and jury deliberation time. Juries 
also increase the risk that even once the trial has run its 
course it may encounter a de novo ruling. For, unique to 
juries, is the problem that the proceeding may be completely 
invalidated due to incorrect instructions to them or to a mis-
carriage on evidentiary grounds. 
5T A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 412 (1915). 
58 Dietz, Baird & BernI, ·ApPENDIX, COMMISSION REPORT, 8'Upr(J note 1, at 153. 
59 Dietz, Baird & Berul, ApPENDIX, COMMISSION REPORT, 8'Upra note I, at 153. 
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Thus, medical malpractice suits necessitate a disproportionate 
amount of court congestion60 and impairment of the speedy dis-
position of other suits.6t Patients who suffer injuries resulting 
in continuing hardships may be forced to endure needless dis-
comfort until the damage award is made. The longer the 
patient-client must wait for the money to be awarded him, the 
longer he will suffer. 
Complementing the financial burden on the court system, 
owing to the lengthier jury trials, is the onus of greater lawyer 
and expert witness fees which is borne by the litigants. That 
this increased financial expense to litigants effectively reduces 
their jury award is counterproductive. Added to these court 
and litigant complaints are those from the jurors themselves 
who resent their sacrifice of time and money from work. It has 
been argued that these anticipated costs and delays save the 
time and cost of litigation by enhancing the chances of pre-trial 
settlement.62 Granted, juries are an unwitting and potent factor 
in the settlement of personal injury claims,88 but query whether 
their presence is not just as likely to encourage suits. Hopes 
for high jury awards, whether realistic or not, entice many 
medical victims to seek out legal remedies." 
80 Court cougestion impelled Professor Carrington to design and urge a dramatic 
restructuring of the federal appellate system to relieve the severe hardships reo 
sulting from the congestion in the federal Courts of Appeals. He too saw the need 
to reform a traditional element of the judiciary which, by remaining an unques· 
tioned bulwark of the judiciary had escaped urgently needed reform. See Carring. 
ton, Crowded Doc7eetB and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function 01 
Review and the N atioftal Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969). 
81 COK1USSION REPORT, 8Upra note 1, at 18. 
82 The American practice of encouraging medical malpractice settlements runs 
contra the English and Canadian approach. The attempt in those countries may be 
to discourage any complaints by making every patient vietory the result of a 
tortuous journey. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 851, 860, 869·70. 
88 Martin, The Role of a Jury in a Civil Casc, in JURY TRIALS supra note 9, at 
168·69: Green, Juries and Justice- The Jury's Role in Personal Injury Cases, 62 U. 
ILLINOIS L. REV. 152, 158·59 (162); Haines, Lecture X, in JURY TRIALS, 8Upra note 
9, at iii·iv (where the differences between civil and criminal trials is urged in 
8Upport of jury usage in civil trials). 
"See gcneraZly, JURY TRIAL PlUCTICE, 8".I!,ra note 22; at 1. 
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In summation, the jury's modern functions of finding fact, 
applying law and promoting a democratic form of justice have 
not been fulfilled. The attempt has not only failed to meet its 
objectives but has worked detrimentally, most particularly in 
the medical malpractice area, where onerous burdens of time 
and money have aggravated the sufferings of our patient-
clients. The omnipresent medical malpractice jury has also 
precluded a potential legal balm for our national health-care 
delivery system. As reported in the prior section, most other 
common law countries have carefully tightened their histori-
cally permissive civil jury procedures, especially in personal 
injury actions. The immediate concern for the rising medical 
malpractice trend, coupled with the possibility of a plan which 
utilizes the medical malpractice jury's benefits while minimizing 
its debilitating burdens, makes this a propitious time for the 
United States to consider revamping its medical malpractice 
jury system. 
PROPOSAL 
A sensible revision of jury use in United States' medical mal-
practice trials would shift the emphasis of responsibility from 
juries to judges. The extent to which we have already deemed 
. our judges the proper source of judicial responsibility is 
frequently overlooked. The trial judge determines the admis-
sion and exclusion of evidence prior to its presentation to the 
jury and later decides whether the sum of the evidence admit-
ted should go to the jury as sufficient to support a verdict.8Il 
If he allows the jury to deliberate, he will limit the jury's use 
of their factual determinations by charging them with what a 
lawful verdict may contain." After the verdict has been given, 
the trial judge can still render a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. mtimately, with or without the trial judge's approval, 
reviewing appellate judges may adjust the damage award 
(additor and remittitur) or even require a new trial de novo. 
811 W. PROSSER, LAw 01' TORTS 205-208 (1971). 
ee Cf., Fleming, Sutflci6ncy of the EvideflCe and Jury-Control Device. Available 
Before Yerdict,47 VA. L. REV. 218 (1961). 
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Judges should be accorded greater responsibility in this 
area since they can significantly remedy the jury's shortcom-
ings. First: judges, no less than jurors, are equipped with the 
human capacity to discern true facts from biased witnesses. 
Supplementing this ability is the judge's familiarity with 
lawyers and the courtroom environment which insulates the 
judge from numerous outside influences.8T Additionally, it can 
be argued that a judge would not become as emotionally en-
meshed in a medical malpractice suit as would a jury. This 
lack of emotional involvement could very possibly result in fewer 
claims being brought by patients.8s Second: judges have the 
necessary legal expertise, completely lacking to juries, with 
which to understand and apply the law. Third: this spe-
cialized knowledge would enable judges to provide judg-
ments more consistent with the law, and with greater internal 
uniformity among factually similar cases. The democratic 
goal of seeking predictability in the law would seem to be more 
nearly realized by judge-made law. Furthermore, greater con-
trol exists over lower court decisions since appellate court 
powers of review are wider for setting aside the decisions made 
by judges than the verdicts of juries '.89 Finally, it seems pos-
sible to avoid the unnecessary time and money costs which 
grow out of the use of juries in medical malpractice suits. 
Despite these advantages, this writer nonetheless urges that 
juries be provided a significant role. The public's direct par-
ticipation in formulating particular standards to which con-
duct in their society is to be measured is a basic attribute of 
democracy which must be preserved. The judge, jury, and 
attorney form an interrelating judicial trinity similar to that 
of our tripartite system of government. 
The writer's model, entailing the shift of responsibility from 
jury to judge in medical malpractice trials, should be initiated 
87 JURY TRIAL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at vii. 
88 It is believed in Canada, for example, that their juryless medical malpractice 
trials result in fewer claims being brought by patients due to less emotional jUdge.s. 
89 8ee Note, Juries: The Western Australian Experience, 11 U. WESTERN Aus-
TRALIA L. REV. 99 (1973). 
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with legislative reform at the state levepo The states have 
generally shown a willingness to experiment with juries and a 
change through legislative enactment would provide for a free 
and candid expression of all views.71 
The proposed model's state-by-state statutory approach is 
presently employed by Canada's provinces. Canada's federal 
"constitution," The British North A.merica Act, provides that 
the determination of trial procedures in civil matters be made 
by each province's own legislature.72 The Constitution of the 
United States, similarly, does not impose standards upon the 
states for jury use in civil cases.78 The enacted provincial 
schemes sharply limit the use of a civil jury in Canada to the 
extent that a civil jury trial is generally unavailable in Canada 
today.7f Whereas the 7th Amendment to the federal constitu-
tion in the United States requires its federal courts to make 
juries available in civil actions at common law where the sum 
in controversy exceeds $20, the Canadian Federal Court is 
expressly prohibited from hearing any causes or matters be-
fore a jury.711 In Canada, all medical malpractice disputes are 
resolved by the Canadian courts applying their law's negligence 
70 Each state's constitution must be examined to determine how its amendment 
may be required. 
The basic premise upon which this paper proceeded was that the litigation of 
medical malpractice suits should be reformed at the court level. (See text at footnote 
7.) Any extra judicial solution would require an unnecessary diminution of judicial 
power, eliminate any possibility of a jury at the initial fact-finding stage, be, more 
lax in its adjudication and would require needless administrative costs. 
71 Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A.J. 367, 370 (1972). 
72 THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, ~ 91 (U.K.) 
provides that the federal Parliament may make laws regarding "all matters not 
coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legisla-
tures of the Provinces .•. " Section 92 U 14 provides that "In each Province the 
Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to ..• [t]he Administration 
of Justice in the Province ... including Procedure in Civil Matters in [the 
Provincial] Courts. 
'1'8 "[T]he Seventh Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts of the United 
States and does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in 
state courts or the standards which must be applied concerning the same." Minne-
apolis By. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211,217 (1916) (Chief Justice White). 
'1'4 A. LINDEN, CANADIAN' NEGLIGENCE LAW a,t 51 (1972). 
'I'll The F.ederal Court Act, B.S., ch. 10 § 49 (2nd Supp.) 
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principles. Some Canadian commentators have opined that 
Canada's limited usage of civil juries is a primary reason why 
Canada has not had to re-examine its judicial approach to 
resolving medical malpractice questions as the United States 
has had to begin doing.18 
The Canadian province of Quebec has made an explicit statu-
tory provision for trial by jury in personal injury actions." 
The use of civil juries in Quebec is nevertheless very carefully 
restricted. There will be no civil jury unless the amount claimed 
exceeds $5,000.18 The jury must be requested by a party on 
motion within 15 days after the filing and the motion "must be 
accompanied by the deposit of the amount (which equals) ... 
the indemnity to which the jurors are entitled and other dis-
bursements necessitated by this mode of trial." 19 This motion 
may be refused by the court "because of the technical nature 
of the evidence . . . or for any other compelling reason." 80 
English law does not provide for a jury in personal injury 
cases and in those limited areas where it does, the jury may 
be denied, as in Quebec, if "the court or judge is of the opinion 
that the trial requires a prolonged examination of documents 
or accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot 
conveniently be made with a jury." (emphasis added).81 
This writer's proposed statutory reform will be limited ex-
clusively to medical malpractice claims. If the amount claimed 
18 A. LINDEN, CANADIAN NEGLIGENCE LAW at 51 (1972); 8ee Welch, Medical MIII-
prtUltjce fA OafllldG, in ApPENDIX, COMMISSION REPORT 850. 
" Statutes of Quebec, 13 & 14 Eliz. II, c; 80, arts. 332-381 (1965). 
1ald. at art. 332. 
"ld. at arts. 333, 334. 
80 ld. at art. 337. In full: 
The court may refuse a trial by jury if, because of the technical nature of the 
evidence to be made, or of the multiplicity of parties, or for any other com-
pelling reason, it considers that it is preferable that the ease be heard by a 
judge alone. 
The judge presiding at a jury trial may, for the same reasons, dismiss the 
jury and hear the ease himllelf. 
No appeal lies from any judgment under this article except in cases where 
trial by jury is refused. 
81 Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1933, 23 & 24 
Gao. 5, c. 36, II. 6; Bee 18 HALSBUBY'S STATUTES 01' ENGLAND (3rd Edn.) 31 (1970). 
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exceeds $200,000 there will be an absolute right to trial by 
jury if demanded by any party within ten days of the filing of 
the complaint. If the amount claimed is not in excess of 
$200,000 no jury will be permitted unless a pre-trial motion for 
a jury is granted by the trial judge. Subsequent to the entering 
of a judgment any party may motion the judge for a new trial 
with a jury. The judge will grant a motion for a new trial or a 
pre-trial jury motion only if the facts demonstrate the necessity 
for a new formulation of the objective standard of community 
conduct. The trial judge's denial of a pre-trial jury motion 
will be reviewable for abuse of discretion. The grant or denial of 
a motion for a new trial, however, is never subject to review. In 
addition to the limited right to appeal pre-trial jury motions 
there is an absolute right of first appeal, subsequent to the entry 
of the trial court's judgment, on grounds that that judgment 
was against the clear weight of the evidence. The result is 
that the propriety of a trial without a jury will only be squarely 
faced by an appellate court upon appeal from the denial of a 
pre-trial jury motion. The appellate court will either affirm the 
judgme~t below or order a new trial. All new trials granted 
on these jury or factual grounds will be tried before a jury. 
(See Appendix.) 
The $200,000 cut-off is designed to remove approximately 
three-quarters of the juries from medical malpractice trials. 
Although 78.6 % of the victims who recover receive awards less 
than $10,000 82 it is estimated that they claim twenty times that 
amount. The setting of a specific monetary sum is analogous 
to the federal jurisdictional amount: it separates the major 
cases, where new law should be allowed to form, from those less 
legally significant.sa 
82 C01ol1olISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. 
sa Although spurious claims in excess of $200,000 might arise, it is anticipated 
that this jurisdictional amount can be adequately policed by state courts in a 
manner similar to that employed by the federal courts. Upon a motion to dismias 
for lack of jurisdiction in federal question and diversity cases federal courts will 
examine the sufficiency of a plaintiff's asserted satisfaction of the $10,000 juris· 
dictional requirement. It is plaintiff's burden to convince the court, through plead· 
ings and affidavits, that the requisite amount is in controversy. C.A. WRIGHT, LAw 
01' FEDERAL COURTS 110·117 (1972). 
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The arbitrary $200,000 cut-off and the judicial discretion to 
grant or deny motions for a jury trial limit access to a jury 
trial and in this respect are of untested constitutionality. The 
constitution in question is that of the individual state's since 
the federal constitution only imposes jury restraints upon the 
federal courts. 
Federal court juries will usually be unavailable to parties 
who fail to satisfy the state jurisdictional amount since diver-
sity of citizenship is prerequisite. In those limited numbers 
of cases which involve out-of-state defendants it is likely that 
a specialist was involved for a major malady - from which the 
largest malpractice claims often generate - thereby overcoming 
the state courts' jurisdictional barrier to a jury trial. 
Support for this incursion into jury rights can be garnered 
from recent United States Supreme Court decisions upholding 
nonunanimous jury verdicts and six person juries." Further-
more, other Supreme Court cases allow a cause of action which 
is "cognizable at law," to be maintained as an equitable action, 
without any jury rights, if the remedy at law is inadequate.-
Legal remedies are inadequate due to, among other factors, 
"the practical abilities and limitations of juries)'88 Medical 
malpractice suits may readily be determined too complex. In 
Ontario, Canada, for example, it has been legislatively deter-
mined that medical malpractice suits are so technical and 
complicated that they must be decided by a judge alone.1T 
Numerous other Canadian provinces and England have pro-
vided the court with wide discretionary power to prevent any 
civil case from coming before a jury if the court deems the 
facts reasonably complicated.88 That the judge's discretion is 
U Bee footnote 30, nprtJ. 
_ Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962). 
88Ro811 v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). The other two factors are: 
remedy Bought and pre-merger custom. There is also a breach' of the fiduciary duty 
between the doctor and patient in medical malpractice suitB: an additional "equity" 
characteristic, BOBB, 396 U.S. at 542. 
87 W. MEREDITH, MALPRACTICE LIABILl'l'Y OJ' DOCTORS AND HOSPITALs: COKMON 
LAw AND QUEBEO LAw 191 (1956). 
88 Ide Bee footnotes 78 and 79, Bt'fWo. 
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carefully limited in the proposed model, to a clear and specific 
standard and that there are ample opportunities for the liti-
gants of smaller claims to move for a new trial and then to 
appeal if denied, supports the likely constitutionality of this 
model. 
The pre-trial jury motion is expedient in its providing for a 
jury trial from the start of court proceedings when it is in-
evitable that one will ultimately be granted. If the motion is 
denied, the party would realize that it is unlikely, barring a 
clearly improper judgment upon the facts, that an appeal would 
succeed. The trial will proceed with all the seriousness at-
tendant upon such a proceeding whose outcome is unlikely to 
be reversed on appeal.89 
The motion for a new trial provides the trial court judge 
with a retrospective glance over the trial. In the unlikely event 
that he believes a jury trial would have been more proper he 
may initiate one by granting the motion. His ruling is not 
reviewable. If the trial judge grants a new trial, it will always 
be before a jury and will not be denied. If the judge denies 
the motion, the appellant can bring an appeal on grounds that 
(1) the pre-trial jury motion was improperly denied or (2) that 
the judgment was against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The latter ground insures against a judge's temptation to 
prejudice or a gross misunderstanding of his case. 
Yet the question remains whether juries should be completely 
unavailable in medical malpractice cases. It is true that when-
ever a jury trial is allowed, even in those malpractice 
suits where there is a claim of $200,000 or more, prohibitively 
high costs in time, money, and effectiveness are perpetuated. 
Yet, it is believed that providing for a jury in just such signifi-
cant court cases allows the jury to perform its essential func-
tion: that of articulating the community's sense of reasonable 
conduct where negligent conduct is alleged. Today's crisis in 
the medical malpractice area mandates that a new balance be 
89 Under the present system about 25% of the medical malpractice trials are ap-
pealed. ApPENDIX, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 154. 
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struck, reintroducing the pressing element of expeditious dis-
posal of claims. Yet, this need does not entirely offset the value 
of some input from a jury. The proposed model preserves the 
jury's essence yet strips off some of the fat; it is believed that 
such limited use of the jury will improve a judicial system 
beset by more problems than it either deserves or need suffer. 
CONCLUSION 
Current methods for resolving medical malpractice disputes 
in the United States are inadequate due to the dramatically 
increasing load of claims requiring resolution. Other common 
law countries generally solve these disputes in their courts by 
applying negligence law. Their trials of medical malpractice 
suits differ, however, from those in the United States in that 
these countries have drastically reduced the availability of 
juries. In light of the historically varied and flexible purposes 
which juries have served and the special difficulties presented 
to a jury in its attempt to fulfill its functions when faced with 
the typically complex medical malpractice case, reform is urged 
for United States' trial procedure. By carefully restricting 
medical malpractice jury use to the most significant cases, it is 
proposed that the more expeditious handling of the suits will 
help remedy the medical malpractice crises without sacrificing 
the jury's essential functions. Adapting the jury system to the 
demands of the times will make the jury institution stronger 
and more enduring for the future. 
STBVEN PAUL Ross 
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APPENDIX 
Proposed Model of Statutory Reform 




JUry trial on demand 
m~tin fo" jUri tria£' 
J'I/,"1/ no 3'11,"1/ AL 
.1 .1 J'I/,f"IJ no J'I/,f"IJ 
Oivil Claim! 
Claim less than 
$200,000 
$5,000 - flO jvrg 'I 
No jury permitted 
Pre-trial jury motion 
Motion for a new trial 
new trial 
with jury 






18111tut" 01 Quebec, 13 & 14 Eliz. n., Co 80, arts. 332·381 (1965). 
II Standard of renew: Abuse of cUseretion. (poet-judgment appeal) • 
• Standard of review: Judplent ap1ut clear weiPt of the eridenee. 
